REWARDS TO INFORMERS.The execution of a law cannot be enforced, unless the violation of it be denounced; the assistance of the informer is therefore altogether as necessary and as meritorious as that of the judge.
We have already had occasion to remark, that with respect to public offences, where no one individual more than another is interested in their prosecution, it has been found necessary to create a sort of magistrate, an accuser-general, to carry on such prosecutions in virtue of his office; but it is indispensably necessary that offences should be denounced to him, before he can begin to act.
In a well-ordered community it would be the duty of every individual possessing evidence of the commission of a crime, to denounce the criminal to the tribunals; and such individual would be disposed so to do.In most countries, however, men in general are desirous of withdrawing from the performance of this duty.Some refuse to perform it from mistaken notions of pity towards the delinquent; others, because they disapprove of some part of the law; others, from the fear of making enemies; many from indolence; almost all from a disinclination to submit to that loss which would arise from the interruption of their ordinary occupations.
In these countries, therefore, it has been found necessary to offer pecuniary rewards to informers.
So far as my knowledge extends, governments have never been advised to discontinue this practice.It is supported by authority, but it is condemned by public opinion: mercenary informations are considered disgraceful, salaried informers, odious.Hence it results, that the reward offered by the law does not possess all its nominal value; the disgrace attached to the service is a drawback upon its amount.The individual is rewarded by the state, and punished by the moral sanction.
Let us examine the usual objections made against mercenary informations.
1.It is odious (it is said) to profit by the evil we have caused to others.
This objection is founded upon a feeling of improper commiseration for the offender; since pity towards the guilty is cruelty towards the innocent.The reward paid to the informer has for its object, the service he has performed; in this respect, he is upon a level with the judge who is paid for passing sentence.The informer is a servant of the government, employed in opposing the internal enemies of the state, as the soldier is a servant employed in opposing its external foes.
2.It introduces into society a system of espionage.
To the word espionage, a stigma is attached: let us substitute the word inspection , which is unconnected with the same prejudices.If this inspection consist in the maintenance of an oppressive system of police, which subjects innocent actions to punishment, which condemns secretly and arbitrarily, it is natural that such a system and its agents should become odious.But if this inspection consist in the maintenance of a system of police, for the preservation of the public tranquillity and the execution of good laws, all its inspectors, and all its guardians, act a useful and salutary part: it is the vicious only who will have reason to complain; it will be formidable to them alone.
3.Pecuniary rewards may induce false witnesses to conspire against the innocent.
If we suppose a public and well-organized system of procedure, in which the innocent are not deprived of any means of defence, the danger resulting from conspiracy will appear but small.Besides the prodigious difficulty of inventing a coherent tale capable of enduring a rigorous examination, there is no comparison between the reward offered by the law, and the risk to which false witnesses are exposed.Mercenary witnesses also are exactly those who excite the greatest distrust in the mind of a judge, and if they are the only witnesses, a suspicion of conspiracy instantly presents itself, and becomes a protection to the accused.
