In the naval service, the laws of England allow a certain sum for each vessel taken or destroyed, and so much for every individual captured.Why is not this method of encouragement extended to the military service?
Is the commander of an army employed in defending a province,---allow him a pension which shall be diminished in proportion to the territory he loses.Is the governor of an important place besieged,---allow him so much for every day that he continues the defence.Is the conquest of a province desirable,---promise to the general employed, besides the honours he shall receive, a sum of money which shall increase in proportion to the territory he acquires, besides giving him a pension, as above, for preserving it when acquired.
To the principal duty of taking and destroying those who are opposed to him, might be added the subordinate duty of preserving the living machines whose exertions are necessary for its accomplishment.
The method proposed for the preservation of prisoners,---why should it not be employed for the preservation of soldiers? It must be acknowledged, that no reward exclusively attached to this subordinate duty could, in the mind of a prudent commander, add anything to the weight of those arguments which arise out of the principal object.A soldier when he is ill, is worth less than nothing: a recruit may not arrive at the moment---may not arrive at all, and when he has arrived, he is not like a veteran.If therefore, it be proper to strengthen motives thus palpable, by a separate and particular reward, it ought at least to be kept in a subordination sufficiently marked with respect to the principal object.
Thus much as to a time of war.In time of peace, the propriety of this method is much less doubtful.
It is then that the attention of a general should be more particularly directed to the preservation of his soldiers.Make him the insurer of their lives, and he will become the rival of Esculapius in medical science, and of Howard in philanthropy.He will no longer be indifferent, whether they encamp upon a hill or in a morass.His vigilance will be exercised upon the quality of his supplies and the arrangement of his hospitals; his discipline will be rendered perfect against those vices of armies, which are sometimes no less destructive than the sword of the enemy.[2]
The same system might be extended to ships of war, in which negligence is so fatal, and in which general rules are so easily enforced.The admiral, or captain, would thus have an immediate interest in the preservation of each sailor.The admirable example of Captain Cook, Who circumnavigated the world, and traversed so many different climates and unknown seas, without the loss of a single sailor, would no longer be unfruitful.His instructions respecting diet, change of air, and cleanliness, would not be neglected.The British navy, it is true, is much Improved in these respects: but who can tell how much greater perfection might be attained, if to the already existing motives were added the influence of a constantly acting interest, which, without injuring any virtue, might supply the place of all, if they were wanting?
In the application of these suggestions, there may be difficulties: are they insurmountable? It is for those who have had experience to reply.
In the treaty made by the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, relative to the troops which the British government hired of him to serve in America, one stipulation was, that for every man not returned to his country, he should receive thirty pounds.I know not whether such a stipulation were customary or not: but whether it were or not, nothing could be more happily imagined, either for the fiscal interest of the sovereign lender, or the interest of the individuals lent.The spirit of party found in this stipulation a theme for declamation, as if its only effect were to give to the prince an interest in the slaughter of his subjects; whilst, if anything could counterbalance the mischievous effects of the treaty, it was this pecuniary condition.It gave to these strangers a security against the negligence or indifference of the borrowers, on account of which they might more willingly have been exposed to danger than native subjects.
The price attached to their loss would act as an insurance that care should be taken to preserve them.
It has been said, that in some countries the emoluments of the commanders of regiments increase in proportion to the number of non-effectives; that is to say, that they receive always the same amount for the pay of their corps, though they have not always the same number of men to pay.Such an arrangement is precisely the opposite of what is recommended above.The number of noneffectives increasing by death or desertion, the commander gains in money what he loses in men.Every penny which he is thus permitted to acquire is a reward offered, if not for murder, at least for negligence.{Note}
