Such, accordingly, has been the course pursued in relation to almost every branch of science, or supposed science.The science, or supposed science of divinity, furnishes exceptions, which are perhaps the only ones.What should we say to a man who should seek to promote physical knowledge by such devices? What should we say to a man, who instead of setting men honestly and fairly to inquire whether , in regard to living powers, for example, the momentum were in the simple or in the duplicate proportion of the velocity---whether heat were a substance, or only a quality of other substances---whether blunt or pointed conductors of electricity were the safest,---should pay them for endeavouring to prove, that in living forces the momentum is in the simple proportion only, that heat is only a quality, and that blunt conductors are the safest?
In divinity however, examples of this method of applying reward are frequent.
It may be said, that an exception ought to be made from the rule, in the cases wherein, on whichever side the truth may be, the utility is clearly on the side thus favoured.Thus there is use, for instance, in the people's believing in the being and attributes of a God:
and that even in a political view, since upon that depends all the assistance which the political can derive from the religious sanction:
and that there can be no use in their disbelieving it.That there is use again, in the people's believing in the truth of the Jewish prophecies;since upon that depends one argument in favour of the truth of that history, the truth of which is one main ground of men's expectation of the rewards and punishments belonging to that sanction.This observation certainly deserves great attention.It exhibits a reason which there may be for making an exception to the rule.It does not, however, invalidate the arguments adduced as above, in favour of it: it does not disprove the probability of the mischiefs on the apprehension of which it is grounded.What it does, is to exhibit a benefit to act in balance against these inconveniences.
If, then, the interests of religion be at variance with those of virtue, and it be necessary to endanger the one in order to promote the efficacy of the other,---so then it must be.
It is to be observed, that all the advantage which can accrue to the cause from this manoe uvre is composed of the difference between what it may derive from these hireling advocates, and what, were there no such artificial encouragement given, it would derive from volunteers.
On this head it may be worth considering, whether the calling forth of the one does not contribute to prevent the enlistment of the other.``What need is there for me, a stranger, to give myself the trouble, when there are so many others whose particular business it is, and who are so well paid for it?'' Of this sort is the language which a man will very naturally hold with himself on such occasions.
A strange circumstance it would be indeed,---and one which would afford no very favourable presumption either of the truth or of the utility of the cause which it is meant to favour,---if all the unbiassed suffrages of any considerable majority in number or value of the thinking men should, if left to themselves, be on the opposite side.
Great, indeed, must be the penury of unbought advocates, that can make it advantageous,---I do not say merely to the cause of truth, but to any cause, however wide of the truth,---to apply to mercenaries for assistance.
Of how little weight the suffrages of the latter are in comparison of those of the former, let any one judge, who has observed the superior eclât with which the word of a layman is received, when it happen to be on the side of orthodoxy.
But however the matter may stand with regard to questions of political importance in which utility is clearly on one side---whatever reason there be for violating the law of impartiality in this case, it ceases altogether when applied to the merely speculative points which form the matter of those articles of faith, to which on a variety of occasions subscriptions or other testimonies of acceptation are required.These will serve as one set of instances of the other branch of the cases, where the mischievous effects of reward are apt to lie concealed; viz.~where, in the case of a line of conduct produced by a reward, apparent or no, the tendency of the reward to produce it is apt not to be apparent at first glance---inasmuch as it may escape observation, that the advantage held forth acts to this purpose in the capacity of a reward.
For an emolument to operate in the capacity of a reward, so as to give birth to action of any kind, it is not necessary that it should be designed so to do.Whenever any such connection is established between emolument on the one part, and a man's conduct on the other, that by acting in any manner he sees that he acquires an emolument or chance of emolument, which without acting in such manner he could not have,---the view of such emolument will operate on him in the capacity of a reward.
It matters not whether it be the sole act which is to entitle him to the reward, or only one act amongst many.It matters not whether it be the act to which the reward is professedly annexed, or any other act of which no mention is made.It may not be held up to view in that character: it may even be not held up to view at all.In this unconspicuous way an emolument may operate, and in a thousand instances does operate, in the capacity of a reward, on a long and indefinite course of action---in short, on the business of a whole life.Whenever, on the part of the same person, two acts are so connected, that the performance of the one is necessary to his having it in his power to perform the other, a reward annexed to the latter operates eventually as if annexed to the former; and, whether designedly or not, it promotes the production of the one act as much as of the other.
